just as much the victims of earthquakes or floods as they are of poor infrastructure, a lack of local relief capacity, and governance problems. The map of climatic risks is thus often overlapped by patterns of political instability, chronic insecurity, and underdevelopment. The line between crisis response and long-term development is consequently unclear, particularly in the context of chronic conflict (for example, in Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo). One uses the term 'complex emergencies' to emphasize the interdependence of the factors governing the vulnerability of populations. Nevertheless, the earthquake in Japan and the nuclear crisis that the tsunami triggered remind us that, in certain circumstances, even rich countries are not immune from crisis, and that their technological superiority can be intricately related to their weaknesses.
The root causes of conflicts between nations have not all been extinguished -far from it. Tensions around Iran, the two Koreas, and both Sudans are just some examples of political and humanitarian fault lines. Nor have noninternational armed conflicts decreased in frequency and gravity. In fact, most conflicts today have a long history and some are seemingly intractable, while the popular uprisings in the Arab world (and the repression that they have encountered) have caused new outbreaks of violence.
Finally, whether manmade or not, whether they strike the richest or the poorest, crises of political, climatic, epidemiological, or tectonic origins affect communities that are increasingly populated and urbanized, the city acting as an amplifier to the vagaries of nature and war. 3 Faced with these multiple causes, planning the humanitarian response becomes more demanding and difficult to implement.
Humanitarian principles put at test
After giving an overview of the risks to populations and possible response strategies, this edition of the Review examines in detail some of the challenges to the principles of humanitarian action that have arisen in recent years, particularly in terms of the manipulation of humanitarian actors or viewpoints for political ends and the consequences that this has for access and perceptions. The future of humanitarian action is also conditioned by military, political, or civilian actors who can not only facilitate but also manipulate or obstruct humanitarian action.
Humanitarian actors, which are much more numerous and present in more areas than in the past, are more exposed to criminal attacks by uncontrolled groups and individuals taking advantage of lawlessness. The fact that most of today's conflicts are non-international in nature complicates access to victims: there has been an increase in fragmentation of armed groups in these conflicts and some of them reject any involvement of foreign actors. In turn, states are often reluctant to allow humanitarian actors to operate on their own territory and may impede dialogue with armed groups that they characterise as terrorist or criminal. Given the risks, humanitarian aid is sometimes conducted through local intermediaries, without the presence of foreign personnel. For example, many humanitarian operations in Somalia are conducted by 'remote control'.
Nevertheless, in situations of armed conflict, the action of impartial humanitarian organizations is envisaged by international law. In view of this pressing challenge, Switzerland has recently developed means for the promotionto both humanitarian organizations and to parties to conflicts -of the rules allowing access. 4 Among the challenges to humanitarian action in conflict situations is the question of the perception by parties to the conflict of humanitarian actors, their activities, and the law. This question of perception is not just one of acceptance in conflict zones. It also arises in public opinion and among policy-makers of the great powers, particularly the United States. Often described as obsolete or irrelevant, international humanitarian law has been particularly tested during the last decade, marked by the 'global war on terror'. The rhetoric of this confrontation has excluded neutral humanitarian space between the coalition of states involved, and the armed groups and terrorist organizations. This question of perception is likewise discussed in the current edition.
Recent crises have also seen a growing number of states entering the humanitarian field, showing more concern towards their own populations. Furthermore, states that are newcomers in humanitarian action, such as Brazil, China, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, are beginning to integrate international solidarity as part of their foreign policy. In so doing, they define the humanitarian response in their own terms, challenging the de facto monopoly of Western organizations. Their conceptions of 'humanitarianism', their motives for supporting aid, and the terms of their support reflect a humanitarian approach different from that of established organizations and donors and more concerned with respecting the sovereignty of the state receiving the aid. In a world that has become multipolar, this change in the structure of the humanitarian sector presents both challenges and opportunities for the traditional Western actors.
Another challenge to principled humanitarian action is the continuous tendency by some states and armed groups to use it for political purposes or to control, or even prevent, the action of foreign humanitarian actors perceived as subversive or unwilling to submit to political injunctions. As we have already mentioned in previous editions of the Review, 5 the states involved in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have adopted a 'comprehensive approach' against the insurgency: both development efforts and humanitarian assistance to local populations are conducted in parallel with, or in continuation of, combat operations against insurgents. Some humanitarian actors have been asked to participate in the 'stabilization' of Afghanistan or Iraq. They have thus risked putting into question their independence and their neutrality. Many humanitarian actors and researchers have warned, including in the Review, 6 against the danger engendered by this type of action of confusing and mixing humanitarians with the military. This approach may be questionable in terms of principles and perception, but it may also turn out to be inefficient, if it fails to win active and sustainable support from the population.
As was recently the case in Libya, states can also call on the need to use force to protect civilian populations. Paradoxically, when military operations present 'humanitarian' objectives, there is a high risk that victims will be designated as 'good' or 'bad'. The use of force to protect civilian populations is also likely to create an amalgam between humanitarian and military action in the eyes of the state against which the battle is being waged. The NATO intervention in Libya -portrayed as a 'humanitarian war' and supported by the concept of the 'Responsibility to Protect' -has contributed to casting doubts about the true nature of the humanitarian endeavour.
While tensions between humanitarian and political actors can be particularly acute in times of conflict, natural disasters also present challenges to organizations' access to, and co-ordination with, local authorities, especially when they hit areas already marked by poverty and/or violence. The massive floods that devastated Pakistan in 2010 affected over 20 million people in a country struggling with several armed groups and having to manage a serious problem of internally displaced persons. Besides the response of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations, the Pakistani army was immediately mobilized to respond to the crisis. There are several lessons to be learnt from the experience of humanitarian actors in their co-ordination with the Pakistani authorities, as discussed by one of the contributions in this edition. 
Editorial

Changing actors and evolving practice
Finally, the humanitarian sector itself is also changing in its composition and practice. The last part of this edition relates to key internal and external developments affecting humanitarian actors and their methods. Following the rise of Western humanitarian organizations during the 1990s, there has been a new wave of humanitarian actors, this time coming from emerging countries. Donors, organizations with an international missionincluding Islamic-inspired organizations -and local movements of citizens and diasporas are increasingly present and visible in crisis response. In addition, the exemplary solidarity of Tunisians vis-à-vis the refugees during the crisis in Libya reminds us that the first acts of assistance generally are the work of the population itself. Support for local capacity-building can play a greater role in the international response, in the name of efficiency. It is also a model promoted by the concerned states, as it is perceived as being more respectful of their sovereignty. However, the model of intervention for humanitarian organizations generally remains that of the unilateral deployment of Western expertise to support the victims of the 'South'. Besides the public intentions to strengthen partnerships, organizations are still struggling to change their practice in this area.
The performance of humanitarian organizations is regularly the object of criticism -and even more of self-criticism -especially during major crises that mobilize international solidarity. Thus, the entire humanitarian sector has been blamed for poor response and co-ordination of the response to the earthquake in Haiti and the floods in Pakistan. In other contexts, such as recently in Libya, it was rather the inability of most organizations to operate in an arena of conflict that called for the sector to reflect critically on its access to populations. The global economic crisis has affected aid funding for many organizations, while donor pressure demanding better performance has increased. 7 Organizations are becoming more professional 8 in order to meet the need for transparency and to respond to concerns to provide the best response for victims. Over time, the sector has changed dramatically by acquiring training, procedures and standards, and mechanisms of assessments and certifications.
Another developing method is that of 'humanitarian diplomacy'. Henry Dunant is certainly the precursor of this practice since, as a private citizen, he created an international movement that persuaded the greatest powers of his time to adopt the first Geneva Convention, thus laying the foundation not only for the Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent but also for international humanitarian law. The Movement in general, and the ICRC in particular, already have a highly developed method of practising humanitarian diplomacy. 9 However, it still remains relatively unknown beyond the Movement. In including a contribution on humanitarian diplomacy in this edition, the Review aims to improve the understanding and recognition of this practice.
Since the late 1980s, communication and information technologies have profoundly changed the way in which humanitarian action is perceived and conducted. The immediacy of information on major world crises (the so-called 'CNN effect') has contributed to reinforcing the importance of the humanitarian response. A new revolution is being realized through the widespread use of communication technology both by the humanitarian organizations and by the beneficiaries. Geo-localization and the use of satellite imagery can detect population movements, measure the extent of a disaster, or confirm the existence of atrocities. Internet access helps people who have been separated to find each other more easily and to mobilize volunteers around the world. The widespread use of mobile phones allows people to communicate their needs or call for help. These technologies are also increasingly used in overcoming problems of access and security, and in facilitating the conduct of operations by 'remote control'. They have greatly reduced the distance between the headquarters of organizations and teams deployed in the most remote places. New information technologies could signify profound changes for the sector with the emergence of new actors, allowing victims themselves to articulate their needs thus creating, de facto, a greater accountability for organizations. *** issues. In the future, the Review will continue to reserve a part of its pages for discussions on contemporary challenges to the humanitarian response to crises.
During the last twenty years, humanitarian action has ceased being a simple epiphenomenon of international relations. It has gained a real influence. It has also become a support for the projectionist will of certain states, including some emerging countries. Its future will depend on the evolution of crises and of political and military actors, but also on its own ability to enhance its quality, its principles, and in particular its independence vis-à-vis political and armed actors, and its accountability vis-à-vis donors and recipients.
While there are many pressures and changes in external factors in the field, there are also internal risks. The ongoing professionalization should not necessarily mean the growth of bureaucratization, even if that risk exists. Nor does it necessarily entail copying the recipes of private sector management. As a victim of its own growth, one of the most pernicious risks for the humanitarian sector is that, by creating large-scale administration or by copying the multinationals, it will come to identify itself through its structure rather than its humanitarian mission.
Indeed, acting as a humanitarian professional cannot be reduced to a series of practical and technical skills. The task is first and foremost to recognize the humanity in each one of us, as remote and different as we may be, and most importantly to refuse to remain a spectator when this humanity is denied or violated.
